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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KEVINA.BOSLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990146-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals his convictions for two counts of forgery, third degree felonies 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. A. Where the evidence was clear as to whom defendant 
intended to defraud, did the trial court err in failing to instruct 
the jury that to convict defendant of forgery, it must find that he 
intended to defraud a specific person or persons? 
B. Where the jury was instructed that conviction for forgery 
required the jury to find that defendant acted with a "purpose to 
defraud/9 did the trial court err in failing to also instruct the 
jury that defendant's conduct must be "intentional?" 
"An appeal... claiming that a jury instruction incorrectly states the law presents a 
question of law which we review for correctness." State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988,989-90 
(Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Archuleta. 850 P.2d 1232,1244 (Utah 1993)). "Even if 
we find an error, however, we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable 
probability the error affected the outcome of his case." Tinoco. 860 P.2d at 990 (citing 
State v.Garrett 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App. 1993)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) provides as follows: 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, 
or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by 
anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, 
completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, 
publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the 
person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed 
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact 
the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of third degree-felony forgery under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) (R. 1-2). On November 10, 1998, a jury found defendant 
guilty as charged (R. 41). The trial court sentenced him on December 21,1998 to two 
concurrent 0-5 year prison terms (R. 81). The court stayed execution of the sentences and 
placed defendant on probation, but ordered him confined to the Box Elder County jail 
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pending a mental health evaluation (R. 81-82). The court also ordered defendant to pay 
restitution, fines, surcharges, and attorney fees (R. 82). 
Defendant filed a Motion for A New Trial on December 29,1998 (R. 85). The 
trial court denied the motion by memorandum decision on February 4,1999 (R. 109-10). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 114). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 7,1997, two stolen checks were placed in the night deposit box at 
Members First Credit Union in Brigham City for deposit in defendant's account (R. 3-4). 
The first check, in the amount of $5,000, was drawn on the account of Foxmoor 
Apartments, and was payable to Barbara Pledger. The name "David N. Henrie" was 
written on the back of the check (R. 153:3-5). The second check, for $250, was drawn on 
the account of William Mercer, payable to Elizabeth Workman, and ostensibly endorsed 
by Ms. Workman (R. 153:10). The checks had been stolen from David Henrie and 
William Mercer (R. 153:12-13). 
Unaware that the checks had been stolen, the credit union called defendant and 
asked him to come in and sign the checks (R. 3).1 Defendant returned to the credit union 
and endorsed the checks with his name (id.). The credit union deposited the checks into 
Although 12 witnesses testified at trial, the record contains the testimony of only 
one witness: investigating officer William Scott Cosgrove (R. 40-41,153). Therefore, in 
order to give continuity to this Statement of Facts, some of the facts in this paragraph are 
taken from the Affidavit in Support of Warrant of Arrest at R. 3-4. 
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defendant's account (id). On July 14, defendant withdrew $4,500 from the account (R. 
4). When credit union employees came to suspect fraud, they notified police (R. 153:3).2 
Detective William Scott Cosgrove questioned defendant at defendant's home in 
Corinne (R. 153:5). Defendant admitted that he had signed the names of David Henrie, 
Barbara Pledger, William Mercer, and Elizabeth Workman on the checks (R. 153:12,25-
27,30-32). He acknowledged that he did not know any of the people whose names he 
had signed (R. 153:9-11,26). 
As Detective Cosgrove recalled his conversation with defendant, "I said[,] who put 
these names on the checks and he says I did. I asked him why and he says, well, some 
friend owed me money for doing some work. I asked him who these friends are so I 
could contact them. He said that he could not recall their names. I said, well, where can I 
locate these friendsf?] He come up with a story that they fish on the river there in 
Corinne. I could possibly locate them there" (R. 153:9-10). 
Defendant was convicted (R. 81). In his Motion for a New Trial, he asserted that 
his trial attorney had provided ineffective assistance because she failed to obtain the 
services of a handwriting expert to testify that defendant had not written the fronts of the 
stolen checks, and because she failed to submit a jury instruction requiring that "the act to 
defraud [must] be done intentionally or knowingly" (R. 89,93). 
2The record does not indicate when or how the credit union became aware of the 
fraud. 
4 
The trial court rejected defendant's claims: 
Defendant now argues that a handwriting expert should have been 
procured to offer evidence indicating that defendant did not write those 
checks. An analysis of the prosecution's evidence will show that the 
prosecution witness did not claim that defendant wrote the checks. Rather, 
he claimed that defendant "admitted writing the checks." 
. . . Under the law, it is not necessary that the State prove the 
defendant wrote the checks The opinion now proffered by the defense 
that a forensic expert has concluded defendant "probably did not produce" 
the writing on the front of the checks is unremarkable. There is no evidence 
to suggest this jury concluded the defendant wrote the front of the checks. 
The jury did not need to even decide that issue. The jury was made well 
aware of that through the questions which were issued by the jury and the 
answers provided. The jury's second question was, "What does it mean to 
utter a check?" The response given to the jury was "utter means to put or 
send into circulation" 
Trial defense counsel's decision not to secure an expert regarding 
handwriting samples was sound and did not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
The second argument appears to be that the failure to provide an 
instruction concerning intent, as propounded by current defense counsel, 
constituted ineffective assistance. The Court has reviewed the instructions 
and concludes that the jury was properly and sufficiently instructed 
concerning intent 
Defense counsel now argues that there is no indication to the jury 
that the defendant must have intended to defraud. Black's Law Dictionary 
Revised Fourth Edition, defines "intent" as follows: 
"Intent. Intent in [the] legal sense is purpose to use particular 
meant to effect certain result... meaning, purpose, 
signification, intendment" 
Black's Law Dictionary further defines "purpose" and "purposely" as 
follows: 
"Purpose. That which one sets before him to accomplish, an 
end, intention, or aim..." 
"Purposely. Intentionally, designedly, consciously,..." 
The words intent and purpose are used to define each other. The Court 
concludes that they are, therefore, for purposes of this offense and these 
5 
instructions synonymous. The jury was properly instructed concerning 
intent. 
The defendant has not shown a legal basis for a new trial and the 
Motion is denied. 
(R. 109-10 (emphasis in original), Addendum A). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the 
crime of forgery requires a finding that defendant had the specific intent to defraud a 
particular person or persons. Since defendant failed to preserve this claim, the Court 
should refuse to reach it. On the merits, however, since the evidence was clear as to 
whom defendant intended to defraud, no instruction setting forth the victims' names was 
necessary. 
Defendant further asserts that the jury should have been instructed that, in order to 
convict defendant, it must find that his conduct was intentional or knowing. In fact, the 
jury was instructed on the mens rea element of the crime with the exact language used in 
the statute. Because the jury instructions mirrored the statutory language, they correctly 
stated the law. 
Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because 
his attorney did not request a jury instruction on specific intent. On the merits, since the 
trial court did not err, trial counsel did not perform deficiently. However, since defendant 
failed to provide an adequate record or to adequately brief this issue under rule 24, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court should refuse to reach this claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON THE MENS REA ELEMENT OF FORGERY 
Defendant asserts that "[i]n the present action, there was obviously confusion by 
the jury as to what exactly constituted intent." Appellant's Brief at 9. On appeal, 
defendant asserts two claims regarding the trial court's instructions to the jury on intent. 
First, defendant claims that under State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995), the 
trial court should have instructed the jury that it must find that defendant had specific 
intent to defraud a particular person. Appellant's Brief at 6. Second, defendant claims 
that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that defendant's conduct must be 
"intentional" to support a conviction. Appellant's Brief at 7-8. 
A. Defendant Waived his Claim that the Trial Court was Required to 
Instruct the Jury that the Crime of Forgery Requires Specific Intent 
Defendant argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury that in order to 
convict defendant, it must find that he intended to defraud a specified person or persons. 
This claim is raised for the first time on appeal. When defendant challenged the trial 
court's jury instructions in his motion for a new trial, his sole ground for doing so was 
that the jury instruction did not specify any culpable mental state (R. 92-93). Defendant 
did not claim, as he does on appeal, that the trial court was required to instruct the jury 
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that it must find that defendant intended to defraud a particular person in order to convict 
him. 
Under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(c), "[n]o party may assign as error any 
portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury in 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground for his 
objection." Rule 19(c) "requires that the matter excepted to and the ground therefor be 
distinctly stated/ State v. Cantu. 750 P.2d 59L 594 (Utah 1988V "Where no grounds are 
apparent from the text of the instruction and no objection is stated, the objection is 
presumed waived." State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State 
v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1986)); see also State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 
(Utah 1989). 
Under general principles of appellate review, it is well settled that a claim of error 
must be specifically presented to the trial court in a timely manner to preserve the issue 
for appeal. State v. Winward. 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Beltran-
Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 33 (Utah App. 1996). "[Ijissues not raised at trial cannot be argued 
for the first time on appeal." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994). As the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims 
of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate 
court will review such claim on appeal. Importantly, the grounds for the 
objection must be distinctly and specifically stated. 
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State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted) (emphasis in 
original). It is a "long-established policy [of appellate review] that the trial court should 
have the first opportunity to address the claim of error." State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 
1107,1109 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,1220 (Utah 1993)). Here, 
the trial court had no such opportunity. 
Since defendant failed either to preserve this claim or to demonstrate manifest 
injustice, the Court should not address it. 
B. On the Merits, the Jury Instructions Given at Trial Followed the Forgery 
Statute and Accurately Stated the Mens Rea of Forgery, 
Even if the Court were to overlook defendant's waiver of this issue, the claim fails 
because the instructions accurately informed the jury of the requisite mental state for 
forgery. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1999) provides that "[e]very offense not involving 
strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, and when the definition of the offense 
does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility." The 
statute defining the offense of forgery specifies a culpable mental state by requiring a 
"purpose to defraud anyone, o r . . . knowledge that [the defendant] is facilitating a fraud to 
be perpetrated by anyone." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). 
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The jury instructions defendant maintains were inaccurate contained the following 
language: 
Before you can find the Defendant guilty of the offense of Forgery, a 
felony of the 3rd Degree, you must find each of the following elements of 
that crime beyond a reasonable doubt: 
COUNTI 
1. That the Defendant, Kevin A. Bosley 
2. On or about July, 1997, at Brigham City, Box Elder County, 
Utah, 
3. Did with a purpose to defraud, 
4. Utter a check in the amount of $5000 
5. On which the name of the maker had been forged. 
(R. 54, jury instruction no. 4, Addendum B). The instruction regarding Count II of the 
information was identical except for the amount of the check (R. 55, jury instruction no. 
5, Addendum B). Both instructions provided that the mental state required was "purpose 
to defraud." 
Since "purpose to defraud" is one of the culpable mental states specified in the 
forgery statute, the jury was instructed in accordance with the applicable statute. Utah's 
appellate courts have held that jury instructions correctly state the applicable law to the 
extent that they track the relevant statutory language. See, e.g.. State v. Cripps. 692 P.2d 
747, 748 (Utah 1984); State v. Larsen. 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah App. 1994); State v. 
Squire, 888 P.2d 1102,1104 (Utah App. 1994); State v.Lopez. 789 P.2d 39,45 (Utah 
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App. 1990). Since instruction nos. 4 and 5 followed the language of the forgery statute, 
they correctly stated the law. 
Defendant relies on State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995) to support 
his argument that a correct instruction required language that defendant intended to 
defraud "anyone." However, because Winward presented distinctive factual 
circumstances, its holding does not apply here. 
Emer Winward, together with his real estate-agent wife, arranged for ownership 
of a piece of real property to change hands three times in a single day. Winward. 909 
P.2d at 910-11. The complex series of transactions resulted in a net profit of nearly 
$5000 to the first buyer, Nicole Packer. Id. at 911. The title company through which the 
transactions were completed issued a check payable to Packer. Unknown to Packer, 
defendant collected the check, forged Packer's name on it, and deposited it in his wife's 
account. Id. At Winward's forgery trial, the prosecution introduced evidence suggesting 
that Winward intended to defraud numerous parties, including Nicole Packer, the 
original sellers, the final buyers, the realty company through which the property was 
listed, and Mrs. Winward's credit union. Id. at 911-12. 
This Court noted that "the State need not prove exactly who the defendant 
intended to defraud, provided the State can prove that the defendant acted with the 
requisite intent to defraud." Id. at 912. However, the Court held that since "the only 
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person that defendant could possibly have intended to defraud by engaging in this 
conduct was Nicole Packer/' the trial court erred in admitting evidence suggesting that 
Winward had committed wrongful acts against the other entities. Id. at 913. The Court 
further held that the trial court's error in admitting the extraneous evidence was 
"compounded by the court's refusal to instruct the jurors that.. . they must find that 
when he signed Packer's name to the check, Winward possessed the specific intent to 
defraud Packer." Id. at 913-14. The Court stated: 
Absent an instruction that carefully and precisely defined specific intent to 
defraud—and, most importantly, conveyed to the jury that, based on the 
facts of this case, the only person that defendant could possibly have 
intended to defraud when he endorsed Nicole Packer's name on the 
checkwas Nicole Packer—the jury lacked the proper framework within 
which it could meaningfully evaluate the necessary elements of the crime 
charged. 
Id. 
Recognizing that the facts in Winward were unique, the Court carefully qualified 
its holding: 
Had the court correctly instructed the jury on the need to find a specific 
intent to defraud, it might well have minimized the confusing and 
misleading effects of the problematic evidence by narrowly focusing the 
jury on the pivotal issue in the case. By the same token, if the evidence was 
well-focused, making clear that if defendant intended to defraud anyone bv 
his unauthorized endorsement it would have to have been Packer, the jury 
instructions could have been less precise. 
Id. (emphasis added). The underlined hypothetical illustrates exactly the situation 
present in this case. Here, the record does not indicate, and defendant has not argued, 
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that evidence was presented to imply that defendant had any purpose to defraud anyone 
other than David Henrie and Elizabeth Workman, from whom the checks were stolen (R. 
153:12-13). It was unnecessary for the jury to be instructed that defendant had a purpose 
to defraud Workman and Henrie because the evidence did not support an inference that 
he intended to defraud anyone else. The potential for confusion of the issues noted in 
Winward does not exist here. Therefore, the general proposition stated in Winward that 
"the State need not prove exactly who the defendant intended to defraud, provided the 
state can prove that the defendant acted with the requisite intent to defraud," id. at 912, 
applied, and the jury instruction given was appropriate. 
C. "Purpose" Means "Intent* 
Defendant also appears to argue that the trial court trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury that defendant's utterance of the forged checks must have been 
"intentional" to constitute forgery.3 Appellant's Brief at 7-8. 
Here, as stated, the culpable mental state for forgery is specified in the forgery 
statute. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102, the applicable mens rea for forgery is 
"purpose to defraud." Since the jury instructions contained that language, trial court was 
not required to provide an additional mens rea instruction. 
3Since defendant did not object to the jury instructions until after trial, this claim 
was waived under Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c). However, since the trial court reached the 
merits of defendant's post-trial challenge to the jury instruction, the State, for purposes of 
this appeal, will not argue waiver. 
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In any event, "intent" and "purpose" have the same meaning. The trial court, 
after noting the definitions of "intent" and "purpose" in Black's Law Dictionary, ruled 
that "[t]he words intent and purpose are used to define each other. The Court concludes 
that they are, therefore, for purposes of this offense and these instructions synonymous." 
(R. 110 (emphasis in original), Addendum A). The trial court was correct under this 
Court's precedent. 4"[I]ntent' and 'purpose' are synonymous 6[P]urpose' is the 
same as 'intent.'" State v. Larsen. 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah App. 1994). 
Since the jury was instructed that forgery required a "purpose to defraud," it 
would have been redundant for the court to further instruct the jury that defendant's 
conduct must also be "intentional." Although defendant claims error because "the jury 
did not have the advantage of the language of Black's Law Dictionary in the 
instructions," the jury did not need a dictionary definition of the word "purpose." The 
term is commonly understood. "Ordinarily, non-technical words of ordinary meaning 
should not be elaborated upon in the instructions given by the court. It is presumed that 
jurors have ordinary intelligence and understand the meaning of ordinary words " 
State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89,94 (Utah 1981) (quoting State v. Dav. 572 P.2d 703, 705 
(Utah 1977). 
Furthermore, even if a jury instruction on intent had been required, jury 
instruction nos. 7 and 8, taken together, instructed the jury on intent. The jury was 
instructed that "in every crime or public offense there must be a union or joint operation 
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of the act and intent" (R. 58, jury instruction no. 8, Addendum B). The jury was also 
given the statutory definitions of "intentional" and "knowing" conduct (R. 57, jury 
instruction no. 7, Addendum B). "We review jury instructions in their entirety and will 
affirm when the instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case." State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219,1231 (Utah 1997); see also 
Larsen, 876 P.2d at 396; State v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah App. 1998); State 
v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929,934 (Utah App. 1991). 
Here, the trial court accurately instructed the jury on the mens rea of forgery using 
the statutory language. Therefore, although the court also instructed the jury regarding 
"intent," the court was not required to do so. Under any analysis, the instructions were 
correct.4 
4Because the trial court correctly instructed the jury, defendant's ineffective 
assistance of counsel argument fails. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, a defendant must show (1) that trial counsel's performance was objectively 
deficient, and (2) that a reasonable probability existed that, absent the deficient conduct, 
more favorable outcome would have occurred at trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995). Since the trial 
court did not err, defendant cannot show deficient performance or, logically, prejudice. 
State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 722 (Utah App. 1997). Therefore, even if defendant had 
adequately briefed his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and even if the record 
were adequate to allow review of the claim, it would fail on the merits. 
However, the claim is inadequately briefed. Under rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, a party to an appeal must provide an argument containing the 
"contentions and reasons of the [party] with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." "Utah courts routinely decline to 
consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 
1998); see also State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989). Furthermore, the 
15 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no important, novel, or complex issues of law, the 
State does not request oral argument, nor that a published opinion issue. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 5 day of fUx^KA 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CATHERINE M. JOHNSON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
record is inadequate to allow review of claim. Although 12 witnesses testified at trial, the 
record on appeal contains a transcript of only one witness's testimony, and does not 
include counsel's opening or closing statements (R. 41,153). Because the record is 
incomplete, this Court cannot review trial counsel's performance as a whole to determine 
whether counsel's alleged deficiencies in reality reflected a legitimate trial strategy. 
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Justin C. Bond 
P.O. Box 895 
29 South Main 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
O ^ W M A ^ Q f\A . Y^M^A 
17 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
UN l O i c r i K D l JUJUlL,IAJLOi51KlUl t U U K i Or THE STATE OF 
UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVINA.BOSLEY, 
Defendant. 
HON- BEN H. H A D F I E L D 
M E M O R A N D U M DECISION 
Case No- 971100120 
This matter is before the Court pursuant to defendant's Motion for a New Trial. The Court 
has received and reviewed the Motion, the Supporting Memorandum and Attachment, the defendant's 
Affidavit and the Response from the State. Oral argument was held on this Motion January 25,1999 and 
the matter was taken under advisement 
Defendant essentially asserts two arguments in support of his Motion for New Trial. These 
assertions are, in essence, the same argument, that is that the defendant did not have "effective assistance 
of counsel" during the trial. 
The first assertion is that the State presented testimony from Officer Cosgrove to the effect that 
defendant admitted writing the checks in question, which were identified at trial as Exhibits 1 and 2. 
Defendant now argues that a handwriting expert should have been procured to offer evidence indicating 
that defendant did not write those checks. An analysis of the prosecution's evidence will show that the 
prosecution witness did not claim that defendant wrote the checks. Rather, he claimed that defendant 
"admitted writing the checks." Officer Cosgrove never offered his opinion as to whether the defendant 
actually wrote the checks. 
The defendant was charged with two counts of forgery. Under the law, it is not necessary that 
the State prove the defendant wrote the checks. In examining Exhibits 1 and 2, even an untrained observer 
would conclude that the faces of the checks were not written by the same person who endorsed "Kevin A. 
Bosley" on the back of the checks. The opinion now proffered by the defense that a forensic expert has 
concluded defendant "probably did not produce" the writing on the front of the checks is unremarkable. 
There is no evidence to suggest this jury concluded the defendant wrote the front of the checks. The jury 
did not need to even decide that issue. The jury was made well aware of that through the questions which 
were issued by the jury and the answers provided. The jury's second question was, "What does it mean to 
utter a check?" The response given to the jury was "utter means to put or send into circulation" (as a check 
or, for example, putting into circulation is uttering a check). 
Trial defense counsel's decision not to secure an expert regarding handwriting samples was 
sound and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
2 
THE STATE OF UTAH v»f KEVIN At BOSLEY, Case No. 971100120 
The second argument appears to be that the failure to provide an instruction concerning intent, 
as propounded by current defense counsel, constituted ineffective assistance. The Court has reviewed the 
instructions and concludes that the jury was properly and sufficiently instructed concerning intent. The 
second question posed by the jury and response provided are as follows: 
Jury Question: Did Kevin Bosley have to physically write and sign the 
names of the other people on the checks to be found guilty or does he just 
have to be aware that they were forged? 
Response: The State must only prove those elements identified in Instruction 
4 and Instruction 5. 
Instruction 4 and 5 were the elements for counts one and two, the two separate forgery charges. 
The third element, in each of those accounts, stated the following: "did, with a purpose to defraud." 
Defense counsel now argues that there is no indication to the jury that the defendant must have 
intended to defraud. Black's Law Dictionary Revised Fourth Edition, defines "intent" as follows: 
"Intent. Intent in legal sense is purpose to use particular means to effect 
certain result... meaning, purpose, signification, intendment," 
Black's Law Dictionary further defines "purpose" and "purposely" as follows: 
"Purpose. That which one sets before him to accomplish; an end, intention, 
or aim . . ." 
"Purposely. Intentionally, designedly, consciously,..." 
The words intent and purpose are used to define each other. The Court concludes that they are, therefore, 
for purposes of this offense and these instructions synonymous. The jury was properly instructed 
concerning intent. 
The defendant has not shown a legal basis for a new trial and the Motion is denied. 
DATED this ^ day of February, 1999. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of February, 1999,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, in the case of State of Utah 
vs. Kevin A. Bosley, case number 971100120, as follows: 
John D. Sorge 
Attorney At Law 
01 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Ronald Perkins 
Attorney At Law 
205 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Addendum B 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
You are instructed that the defendant has been charged by the State of Utah with the 
offence of Forgery, a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
Before you can find the Defendant guilty of the offense of Forgery , a Felony of the 3rd 
Degree, you must find each of the following elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt: 
COUNT I 
1. That the Defendant, Kevin A. Bosley 
2. On or about July, 1997, at Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah, 
3. Did with a purpose to defraud, 
4. Utter a check in the amount of $5000 
5. On which the name of the maker had been forged. 
If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the state has proved each of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of Forgery, 
a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proved each of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty of Forgery, 
a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £ 
You are instructed that the defendant has been charged by the State of Utah with the 
offence of Forgery, a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
Before you can find the Defendant guilty of the offense of Forgery , a Felony of the 3rd 
Degree, you must find each of the following elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt: 
COUNTH 
1. That the Defendant, Kevin A. Bosley 
2. On or about July, 1997, at Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah, 
3. Did with a purpose to defraud, 
4. Utter a check in the amount of $250 
5. On which the name of the maker had been forged. 
If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the state has proved each of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of Forgeiy, 
a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proved each of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty of Forgery, 
a Felony of the 3rd Degree. 
INSTRUCTION NO. *7 
A person engages in conduct intentionally, with respect to the nature of his conduct, or to 
a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Conduct means an act or omission. An 
act is a voluntary bodily movement. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense there must be a union or joint 
operation of the act and intent. The intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances 
connected with the offense and the sound mind and discretion of the accused. 
